I estimate the impact of a Louisiana state policy that mandated FAFSA applications as a high school graduation requirement. I find significant increases in FAFSA completion rates (19 percentage points), and my estimates imply an increase of 1-2 percentage points in college enrollment. There is suggestive evidence that these effects were more concentrated among lower-income students/schools and merit-based state financial aid applications also increased. The design of this mandate implies that pushing students into action may be more effective than informational nudges and that localized support systems such as counselors are important for the success of a top-down policy.
(accepted at JHR)
Using administrative data from Texas, I track individuals from high school through college to the workforce to determine the effects of local labor markets on occupational choice. I find local labor market conditions are countercyclical with selection into teaching. Individuals sorting into teaching because of poor local labor market conditions are of higher ability (standardized tests) and have higher productivity (value-added). The findings suggest local labor market fluctuations shape career decisions well before individuals participate in the labor market, and increasing the relative economic standing of teaching as a career has the potential to improve the future supply of teachers.
(submitted) [media: Dallas Fed podcast; Fordham Institute; Texas Standard; Cato]
We provide a comprehensive analysis of a Texas policy that relaxed teacher licensing requirements and created a large for-profit training industry. Using detailed administrative data, we show that for-profit-trained teachers have higher turnover and lower value-added than standard-trained teachers. But the policy significantly increased the supply of certified teachers, reducing schools’ reliance on uncertified teachers with even worse outcomes. Exploiting variation in policy exposure across schools, we find a zero net impact on student achievement due to these offsetting forces. Thus lower licensing requirements improved access to teaching and reduced training costs without harming students.
We use Texas administrative data to assess the long-standing claim that teacher certification exams discriminate against underrepresented minority (URM) candidates. In a regression discontinuity design, we find that failing a certification exam delays entry into teaching and costs the average candidate $10,000 in forgone earnings. These costs fall disproportionately on URM candidates both because they are more likely to fail and because their earnings losses from failing are 50 percent larger on average. To examine whether these disparities are justified by racial/ethnic differences in teaching quality, we develop a new measure of disparate impact and estimate it using a policy change that increased the difficulty of Texas’ elementary certification exam. The harder exam reduced the URM share of new teachers but had no significant benefits for teaching quality or student achievement. Taken together, our findings show that certification exams have a disparate impact in the sense that they impose much larger economic costs on URM teaching candidates than on white candidates with similar potential teaching quality.
My views do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System